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Abstract
Privatization, or contracting with non-governmental agencies for provision
of state or federally funded services, is a strategy that has gained recent attention from policymakers as a potential tool for successful child welfare reform. The Child Welfare Privatization Initiatives Project was created in 2007
as a joint effort between the United States Department of Health and Human
Services and the Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. The framework identiﬁed by this project produced twelve key considerations for states moving towards a privatized system. This case study considers these twelve considerations in a description of the large-scale effort to
privatize child welfare services in the state of Nebraska that began in 2008.
Problems leading to a need for child welfare reform and possible factors that
motivated policymakers to shift services from the public to the private sector are also described. While proponents of privatization appeared to expect
rapid increased efﬁciency and cost-savings, this case study explores multiple reductions in quality and availability of services for children and families
served by the child welfare system that occurred during the effort. Further,
the cost of child welfare services in Nebraska increased by 27% and the private agencies invested over $21 million of their own funds as they attempted
to uphold contracts. Recommendations for practitioners and policymakers
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considering participating in efforts to privatize child welfare services in the
future are made based on Nebraska’s recent experience.
Keywords: Privatization, Child welfare, Child maltreatment

1. Introduction
Privatization, which is a term that refers to contracting with non
governmental agencies for provision of state or federally funded services, is a strategy that has gained recent attention from policymakers as a potential tool for successful child welfare reform (Westat &
Chapin Hall Center for Children, 2002). Proponents of the strategy
argue that the competition of the private marketplace creates incentives for delivery of more efﬁcient and effective services (U.S. DHHS,
2007). It is argued that marketplace competition increases efﬁciency
by making service providers motivated to be as productive as possible without wasted expense. It is also argued that effectiveness is increased through creation of a situation in which providers most capable of producing desired outcomes of child welfare services are
rewarded by continued and increased funding. Further, some view the
private sector as more capable of developing new services and changing in response to consumer needs. Finally, consumer choice and competitive bidding for government contracts is proposed to make agencies more accountable for delivery of desired outcomes. There are
certainly many examples of effective public–private partnerships in
social-service delivery. For example, in the area of early childcare, a
large pool of potential providers exists (e.g., in-home daycares, church
centers) and many families qualify for federal assistance with covering the cost of childcare. In this area, federal funding agencies have
developed successful partnerships with private providers by increasing funding to those demonstrating delivery of high quality care (Zellman & Perlman, 2008).
Not all observers agree that the aforementioned beneﬁts will necessarily result from the privatization of child welfare services. Critics argue that the potential beneﬁts of moving social services such as
child welfare to the private sector are difﬁcult to achieve and measure
(Smith & Lipsky, 1992). When state governments offer contracts for
private companies to deliver a service they once controlled, they create a situation wherein the government is the only authorized buyer
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of these services and thus there is no oversight ensuring that the
highest quality or most effective service providers are awarded contracts. Further, if an ample pool of potential providers does not exist
in a given area, there will be additional lack of competition. Unlike in
other marketplaces, where consumers create accountability by choosing not to purchase inadequate goods or services, those served by the
child welfare system rarely are able to make choices regarding the services they receive. Therefore, critics argue, privatization is unlikely to
lead to more effective services unless the government closely monitors and evaluates service provision. Further, the costs of monitoring
the private system and increased administrative responsibilities associated with overseeing contracts with private agencies reduce any
cost efﬁciency gained from competition. Critics also warn that moving child welfare services to the private sector may create incentives
for agencies to increase proﬁts by providing less costly and potentially
less effective services (Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004). Some worry that
after agencies have been awarded government contracts, in the absence of careful monitoring, they can reduce costs and increase proﬁts
through methods that diminish the quality of services for children and
families, such as hiring less experienced staff, increasing worker caseloads, and providing lower levels of supervision.
While many states provide portions of their child welfare services through contracts with non-governmental agencies, statewide
privatization efforts in Florida, Kansas, and most recently, Nebraska
are unique for their inclusion of all children in the child welfare system and all elements of their foster care systems (Flaherty, Collins-Camargo, & Lee, 2008; Nebraska Health and Human Services Committee,
2011; Unruh & Hodgkin, 2004; Westat & Chapin Hall Center for Children, 2002). The increased interest in statewide privatization efforts
led the federal government to put forth a framework of recommendations for future endeavors. In conjunction with the United States Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. DHHS), the Ofﬁce of the
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) created the
Child Welfare Privatization Initiatives Project (CWPI), which provides
welfare administrators with information about the implementation of
privatized services (U.S. DHHS, 2007). These recommendations target the justiﬁcation for privatization, planning for and design of the
effort, its implementation, and the evaluation of outcomes.
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Although privatization is an increasingly popular tool, little research has examined its success in improving services and outcomes
for children and families (Flaherty et al., 2008). This paper examines
Nebraska’s wide-sweeping privatization of child welfare services as
a case study of changes in service efﬁciency and quality. The CWPI
framework is applied to Nebraska’s privatization effort. The intent of
the investigation is to provide insight into the complexity and challenges inherent to expanded private sector delivery of child welfare
services.

2. Background
2.1. Deﬁcits in services that created a need for child welfare reform in
Nebraska
Prior to 2009, child welfare services in Nebraska were administrated
and delivered by the Division of Children and Family Services within
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Nebraska’s
privatization effort was partially driven by a need for child welfare
reform that would allow the state to meet recommendations from a
series of Child and Family Services Reviews conducted by the federal
Children’s Bureau (DHHS, 2011a). In 2002, the Child and Family Services Review (CFSR) assessed seven safety, permanency, and wellbeing outcomes in regard to the provision of child welfare services.
These outcomes were:
1. Children are, ﬁrst and foremost, protected from abuse and
neglect.
2. Children are safely maintained in their homes whenever possible and appropriate.
3. Children have permanency and stability in their living
situations.
4. The continuity of family relationships and connections is preserved for children.
5. Families have enhanced capability to provide for their children’s needs.
6. Children receive appropriate services to meet their educational
needs.
7. Children receive adequate services to meet their physical and
mental health needs.

H u b e l e t a l . i n C h i l d r e n a n d Yo u t h S e r v i c e s R e v i e w 3 5 ( 2 0 1 3 )

5

The review identiﬁed speciﬁc items on which Nebraska met national standards; however, the state failed to achieve substantial conformity with any of the seven outcomes (U.S. DHHS, 2002). Following the CFSR in 2002, Nebraska produced and implemented a Program
Improvement Plan, grounded in “Family Centered Practice” in 2006
(DHHS, 2006). The proposed systemic changes to the child welfare
system included a team approach to services and supports, a recognition that the role of supervisor is paramount to helping change occur
within children and families, and the development of a Quality Assurance system and protocols at both statewide and local levels. Further,
in 2005, Nebraska received an incentive payment of $352,000 from
the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) for completing
more adoptions in 2004 than in either 2002 or 2003 (DHHS, 2006).
Despite the efforts made through the Program Improvement Plan and
federal incentives to improve child welfare services, deﬁcits in Nebraska’s ability to deliver child welfare services remained evident in
the next CFSR, which occurred in 2008. When the ﬁnal report from
the 2008 review was released, Nebraska again failed to achieve substantial conformity with any of the seven outcomes described above
(U.S. DHHS, 2009).
In addition to pressure to reform child welfare (and improve services for children) in an effort to meet recommendations from the
CFSR, Nebraska state government was simultaneously under pressure to reduce the cost of child welfare services. For many years, Nebraska had documented a rate of out-of-home placement of children
that was particularly high when compared to other states. In the years
2005 through 2007, Nebraska’s rate of out-of-home placement of children was 12% — double the national average of 5.6% (Platte Institute
for Economic Research, 2009). When children are placed out-of-home
following child maltreatment, federal policy stipulates that they receive services that are only partially reimbursed through federal Social
Security entitlement funds. Therefore, state spending on non-reimbursed services for the increasing number of children placed out-ofhome created a ﬁscal problem for Nebraska. Further, many saw entitlement funding as creating a ﬁnancial incentive for placing children
in out-of-home care and a hindrance to provision of services aimed
at family preservation because children could only access these partially reimbursed services if they were placed out-of-home (Platte Institute for Economic Research, 2009). Proponents of Nebraska’s efforts
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to reform child welfare services through privatization argued that the
state could resolve this dilemma by creating contracts with private,
for-proﬁt agencies that would include incentives for both keeping children safe and preserving families (Young, 2009b).
2.2. History
In September 2008, Nebraska’s Division of Children and Family Services released their Recommendations for the Reform of Out-of-Home
Care (DHHS, 2008). Under the proposed framework, the Division of
Children and Family Services would maintain responsibility for “initial assessments of child or community safety and…for all key case
decision making, such as decisions related to safety assessments, case
plans and court reports, treatment needs, and recommendations for
case closure, including adoptions” (DHHS, 2008, p. 2). Responsibility
for day-to-day provision of child welfare services and services coor
dination was to be allocated to private, contracting agencies (DHHS,
2008). Thus, lead agencies were to be responsible for almost all services provided directly by professionals to families in the child welfare system, including foster care, mental health treatment, supervised
visits, and other assistance in carrying out case plans. By July 2009, 6
private, not-for-proﬁt “lead agencies” had signed “implementation”
contracts with the state (DHHS, 2011a). These contracts required the
agencies to develop plans and hire staff capable of providing child welfare services and coordination.
Each lead agency was responsible for service provision across
speciﬁc counties and regions of the state. Nebraska is largely rural
and sparsely populated, with approximately 1,856,000 people spread
across 93 counties. The majority of the state’s population is located
in just three counties in southeastern Nebraska; as such, the number
of cases that each lead agency was responsible for did not reﬂect the
amount of land they served. Table 1 provides a summary of each lead
Agency and its contract with the State. Agency 1 oversaw ﬁve partner agencies providing services for children and families in partially
urban southeastern Nebraska. Agency 1 was responsible for approximately 2400 children (DHHS, 2011a). Agency 2, based in neighboring state Kansas, was responsible for serving approximately 3600
children and began providing services in both urban and rural eastern and southeastern counties in November 2009. However, Agency
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Table 1. Summary of lead agency’s state contracts.
Area(s) of
service provision
		
		

Approximate
number of
families to be
served

Approximate
start date
of service
provision

Contract
termination
date

Summary of reason for contract
termination

Agency 1

Urban and rural
southeastern counties

2400

November 2009

—

—

Agency 2

Urban and rural
3600
November 2009
February 2012
southeastern and 				
eastern counties				

Agency 3

Desire to return to fee-for-service
system, inability to operate
within projected budget

Rural central, western,
1300
November 2009
September 2010
and northern counties				
					
					

Increased costs due to administration
responsibly shared with the State,
inability to operate within projected 		
budget

Agency 4

Inability to operate within projected
budget, bankruptcy

Urban and rural
1000
November 2009
April 2010
southeastern counties				

Agency 5

Rural southeastern
400
November 2009
April 2010
counties 				
					
					

Increased costs due to shared case
planning responsibilities with the
State, inability to operate within 		
projected budget

Agency 6

Viewed allocated funds as insufficient
for covering cost of agency service 		

Rural central and
—
Never provided
October 2009
western counties		
services		
				
provision

All agencies had signed implementation contracts with the state by July of 2009. Full implementation of contracts was required by April 1, 2010.

2 did not have a Nebraska headquarters until late December of that
year (Boettcher, 2009). Agency 3, an Iowa-based organization, was responsible for the provision of services in rural central, western, and
northern Nebraska. Responsible for 50 subcontracting service-providing agencies across 71 counties, Agency 3 agreed to oversee approximately 1300 cases (DHHS, 2011b). Sixteen urban and rural counties
in southeast Nebraska received services under the oversight of lead
Agency 4. Agency 5 was responsible for the provision of services in a
portion of southeastern Nebraska, an area containing 12 rural counties. Agency 6 was slated to become a lead agency across Nebraska’s
central and western counties.
The six lead agencies that signed implementation contracts were
subject to new risk-based reimbursement procedures (rather than the
former fee-for-service system), a child welfare reform strategy that
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borrows heavily from managed health care principals. In a risk-based
payment system, service providers are granted a ﬁxed payment in advance that is theoretically based on a prospective estimate of the cost
of service delivery. One potential advantage of a risk-based payment
system is reduction of a key challenge to traditional fee-for service
systems: the fact that favorable changes in utilization of services for
children placed out-of-home are accompanied by reductions in federal
entitlement funds (Wulczyn, 2000). For example, in a traditional feefor-service system, an agency that safely reunited children with their
families quickly would receive fewer federal dollars than a slower
moving agency due to the greater amount of foster care service utilized by children served by the slower moving agency. However, prospective payments also inherently redistribute the ﬁnancial risk involved with service delivery away from the funder to the provider, a
feature that often leads to anxiety among providers about their ability to stay within a projected budget (Wulczyn, 2000).
Worries about ability to deliver services to children and families while staying within projected budgets were certainly present
as agencies in Nebraska negotiated with DHHS. In October 2009,
Agency 6 announced that it would not sign a second contract to provide child welfare services. A local newspaper reported that after
learning that its contract would be about 1 million dollars less than
expected, the agency director believed the “State had placed the
[agency] in a position in which it didn’t make sense to move forward” (Young, 2009a). Without the promise of service provision
from Agency 6, Agency 3 became the only provider of services to rural central, western, and northern Nebraska. While the remaining
ﬁve agencies signed contracts agreeing to continue to provide services, they also told news media of worries about the ﬁnancial risks
they would be taking on and their ability to provide services with
the limited amount of funding they would be provided by the state
(Young, 2009a). The DHHS contracts underwrote the costs of services, allocating approximately 2 million dollars fewer to the lead
agencies than had been previously spent on service provision by the
state itself (Young, 2012b).
By April 2010, concerns expressed by the lead agencies about
their inability to effectively deliver services using the funds budgeted
by DHHS had become a reality. Agency 5 withdrew from its role in

H u b e l e t a l . i n C h i l d r e n a n d Yo u t h S e r v i c e s R e v i e w 3 5 ( 2 0 1 3 )

9

the child welfare reform process, stating that, partially due to the increased cost that had occurred as a result of both the agency and the
state being responsible for case planning, it had incurred signiﬁcantly
more expenses than projected and would no longer be able to operate
if they were to continue losing money (Young, 2010a). Also in April
2010, Agency 4 ﬁled for bankruptcy, partially due to the increased
costs experienced during privatization, and the state shortly thereafter terminated its contract with the Agency (Stoddard, 2010). The
abrupt ending of this agency’s contract led to a need for DHHS to immediately provide continued foster care, mental health treatment, and
supervised visits with parents for approximately 2000 children served
by child welfare (Stoddard, 2010). In September 2010, Agency 3 announced that, due to inability to handle administration, billing, and
subcontractor payments, it had mutually agreed to terminate its contract with DHHS (Young, 2010c).
By October 2011, DHHS had reassumed responsibility for provision of services to children living in the large rural portion of Nebraska once served by Agency 3 and had provided additional funding
to the two remaining agencies, who continued to provide services to
children in the partially-urban southeastern portion of the state (Nebraska Foster Care Review Board, 2011). At a brieﬁng to DHHS in
November 2010, legislators and agency directors expressed concern
about the ability of the two remaining lead agencies to manage the
child welfare cases in southeastern Nebraska (DHHS, 2011a). Despite
these concerns, Nebraska Governor Heineman authorized increased
funding to the two remaining agencies in accordance with a plan to
transfer additional case management responsibilities to these agencies. Even with increased funding, Agency 2 continued to struggle with
budgeting for service provision through the risk-based reimbursement
system and attempted to negotiate with DHHS to return to a fee-forservice system (Young, 2012a). The two parties were unable to come
to an agreement regarding funding, leading DHHS and Agency 2 to
terminate their contract in February 2012 (Stoddard, 2012a). Following termination of its contract with Agency 2, DHHS reassumed responsibility for the large majority of child welfare services; by the end
of February 2012, Agency 1 was providing services to children in Nebraska’s largest city, while DHHS was again providing services to the
remainder of the state (Stoddard, 2012a).
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3. Changes in services for children and families that followed
privatization
On January 14, 2011, the Nebraska Unicameral Legislature introduced
and passed a resolution (LR 37) authorizing the Health and Human
Services Committee to investigate and assess the state’s attempt to reform child welfare services through privatization (DHHS, 2011a). The
report completed by this committee, entitled “DHHS Privatization of
Child Welfare and Juvenile Services” (hereafter referred to as the performance audit; DHHS, 2011a) provided the legislature with a detailed
timeline of the events leading to privatization and ﬁndings regarding DHHS’ adherence to their responsibility to protect the welfare of
children. Overall, the performance audit that was generated as a result of this legislation was negative and pointed to multiple deﬁcits
in services for children and families served by the child welfare system that occurred during the reform effort.
The ﬁnancial audit included in the performance audit conﬁrmed
the agency director’s initial concerns about the ability to provide services within capitated budgets proposed by the state. The cost of child
welfare services in Nebraska increased by 27% over the course of the
reform effort and the private agencies invested over 21 million dollars of their own funds as they attempted to uphold contracts (DHHS,
2011a). Further, throughout the privatization effort, the intended improvements in the range and quality of services for children and families did not occur. During the privatization effort, the statewide rate
of maltreatment reoccurrence after a child was referred to the system
remained above national standards and there was no signiﬁcant reduction in the number of children in out-of-home care (DHHS, 2011a).
The performance audit also concluded that instability resulting
from sequential ending of contracts by lead agencies led families to
experience frequent changes in their caseworkers and treatment providers (DHHS, 2011a). Further, the lead agency’s inability to operate
within the budgets they were provided by DHHS led to reduced options
for children in need of out-of-home care. Agencies were frequently unable to pay subcontracts to group homes and shelters and subsidies
to foster parents and; therefore, homes and shelters closed and foster parents were unable or refused to provide care for new children.
Finally, the performance audit found that lead agencies were unable
to comply with the administrative requirements of their contracts
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with the state. Review of agency records found non-compliance with
state requirements for reporting caseworker changes, child placement
changes, and other documentation in children’s ﬁles.
In response to the performance audit, the legislature promised
increased transparency during the 2012 session and began holding
public hearings on the reform efforts. In March 2012, the state resumed control of the child welfare system and the legislature passed
ﬁve bills that created a foundation for improved provision of services. This package of bills included the creation of the Nebraska Children’s Commission and the Inspector General for Child Welfare (LR
821), updated provisions related to case management and caseloads
(LR 961), and requirements for foster care licensure and funding (LR
820). Additionally, LR 949 required the development of a strategic
plan including goals, benchmarks, and progress reports and the creation of a separate child welfare budget (Hein & Roush, 2012). Nebraska DHHS was also required to develop a statewide child welfare
information system (LR 1160). Though initially opposed to the legislation and in favor of continuing within the privatized system, Governor Heineman signed the package of bills in April 2012. This collaborative reform process occurred in stark contrast to the original
privatization effort, which was enacted by DHHS without input from
the legislature or other key stakeholders.
On July 6, 2012, Governor Heineman released a statement regarding the current state of child welfare reform in Nebraska, identifying the rate of out-of-home placement at twice the national average
as a signiﬁcant area of concern (Heineman, 2012). Further information was provided regarding the role of the Nebraska Children’s Commission (LR 821) in assisting the development of the strategic plan
for welfare reform and a timeline for monthly meetings through November 2012. Governor Heineman reiterated that budget issues related to the welfare reform recommendations remain a concern, indicating that increased funding for the child welfare system would
potentially reduce the state’s ability to provide for K-12 schools and
higher education.
In August 2012, Nebraska received the ﬁrst of three expected penalties for failing to comply with federal regulations regarding the use
of foster care funds under privatization from ﬁscal years 2010, 2011
and 2012 (Stoddard, 2012c). Though Nebraska had not sought required
federal approval for any contracts put in place during privatization,
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the current DHHS Children and Family Services director reported that
the department had been working closely with the federal government
to ensure compliance since March 2012. In addition to complying with
federal guidelines, Nebraska had been implementing requirements
identiﬁed under the new legislation in an attempt to rapidly ﬁx the
failed system. The Foster Care Review Board was replaced by an advisory board consisting of ﬁve members, tasked with stabilizing the provision of services through collaborations with the legislature (Young,
2012b). A standardized system of assessing risk and making a determination of services, Structured Decision Making, was implemented
statewide; by October of 2012, the number of children in the child welfare system had reached a 12-year low (Stoddard, 2012d). On December 14, 2012, the Nebraska Children’s Commission (LR 821) proposed
its strategic plan for improving outcomes for children and families
in the child welfare system. The identiﬁed goal is for this framework
to become more detailed throughout 2013 through collaborations between the Commission, the Children and Family Services Division of
DHHS, and the legislature (Young, 2012d).

4. Factors that may have affected Nebraska’s readiness to move
to a Privatized System
In seeking to understand the reasons underlying the failure of Nebraska’s statewide child welfare privatization effort, it is instructive
to examine earlier efforts to synthesize the lessons learned from previous privatization efforts. The CWPI (U.S. DHHS, 2007) reviewed
existing successes and failures of statewide and local child welfare
privatization, and produced a report that includes twelve key considerations for states wishing to move towards a privatized system. Unfortunately, Nebraska’s Health and Human Services Committee review
of the state’s privatization effort clearly indicates that these and other
similar recommendations for privatization were not fully taken into
account. Below, 10 of the 12 key considerations that are most applicable to understanding the failure of Nebraska’s privatization effort
are examined. Factors that may have affected Nebraska’s readiness to
move to a privatized system are also organized across these 10 considerations in Table 2.
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Table 2. Factors that may have affected Nebraska’s readiness to move to a privatized system.
Child welfare privatization initiatives project key
consideration

Circumstances and conditions in Nebraska during initial stages of
privatization

Why privatize?

• Pressure to quickly improve child welfare services due to failed Child
and Family Services Reviews and media attention on high proﬁle
child welfare cases
• Desire to reduce State spending

What is the level of stakeholder support for
privatization?

• Executive branch engaged in privatization process without
involvement of the legislature
• Community critical of rapid switch to privatized system and lack of
careful planning

Has the public agency set aside enough time
for planning and designing the initiative?

• No evidence of acute crisis within the child welfare system
• Full-scale implementation of initiative after 10 months of planning

Are there sufﬁcient administrative and cost
data to develop contracts and estimate case
rates and other service costs?

• No cost–beneﬁt analysis preformed prior to initiative
• Goals, benchmarks, and timeframes poorly deﬁned
• Lead agencies had little-to-no experience with provision of Child
Welfare services in Nebraska

Is there viable competition in the community to
provide the targeted services?

• Very few available providers of child welfare services
• Little-to-no competition among agencies bidding for government
contracts
• General lack of skilled child welfare professionals in the job market

Do providers have sufﬁcient skills and
administrative capacity to manage largescale contracts and monitor service delivery
and client outcomes?

• Lead agencies had little-to-no experience managing large-scale
contracts or coordinating community-based services
• Contracts awarded to agencies without evaluation of skills/capacity

Do private agency front-line staff have
sufﬁcient skills and knowledge about child
welfare policies and evidence-based reform
to deliver services?

• Historical State difﬁculties with hiring and retaining well-trained child
welfare professionals
• Lead agencies inexperienced in hiring and training qualiﬁed staff

Is the public agency prepared to design a
new service delivery system and assume
new roles focused on contract design,
procurement, and monitoring?

• State agencies with expertise in planning and execution of public–
private contracts were not consulted in planning the initiative
• Executive branch allocated unrealistically low budgets for lead
agencies
• Goals, benchmarks, and timeframes poorly deﬁned

Are roles and responsibilities clear between the
public and private sectors?

• Frequently shifting and poorly deﬁned State and private roles and
responsibilities

Will privatizing services alone bring about
improved outcomes or will the agency need
to implement other reforms in tandem with
privatization?

• No logical model identiﬁed for linking the initiative to the State’s
current difﬁculties in child welfare service delivery
• Lowering State spending was a major goal for the reform, however it
was not clear how this outcome would improve services for children
and families
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4.1. Key considerations
4.1.1. Why privatize?
Nationally, there are several key arguments that are used in support
of privatization of public social services, central to which are potential for reducing government spending and improving the quality of
government services (Winston, Burwick, McConnell, & Roper, 2002).
These arguments are based primarily on the basic economic tenet that
a competitive marketplace will lead to less costly but higher quality
goods and services. By deﬁnition, for a marketplace to produce competition, a range of alternatives must exist among which buyers can
choose among (Van Slyke, 2003). When this tenet operates successfully and consumers have the knowledge and ability to select superior
alternatives, providers deliver the best and most cost-effective services possible because, if they do not, they will lose contracts or clients to more successful providers. Proponents also often believe that a
larger body of skilled workers exists in the private sector and that the
private sector has greater ﬂexibility to recruit and hire skilled workers and deliver quality services due to the relative absence of bureaucracy commonly found within the public sector (Winston et al., 2002).
Despite the logic inherent in these arguments, evidence from
states that have attempted to privatize child welfare services indicates that privatization alone is not capable of improving the quality of child welfare services or reducing their cost (U.S. DHHS, 2007).
A study of six states’ (i.e., Kansas, Florida, Missouri, Ohio, Michigan, and Maine) efforts to privatize child welfare services conducted
by Children’s Rights concluded that given the cost of providing and
overseeing quality child welfare services to families, public agencies
should not expect cost-savings to come from privatization (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). In Kansas, a state that shares a border
with and is similar to Nebraska in terms of population demographics
and geographic distribution, a statewide effort to privatize child welfare services that began in 1996 resulted in signiﬁcant ﬁnancial losses
for contracting providers (Unruh &Hodgkin, 2004). The child welfare
system serves a population of families with complex and difﬁcult-totreat problems and working with such families is often emotionally
trying. These stresses and challenges lead to difﬁculty in ﬁnding and
retaining a high quality workforce and demonstrating that services
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are effective regardless of the source (public, private) of service provision (Winston et al., 2002).
Given the failure of previous privatization efforts to reduce costs
or enhance service quality or availability, the CWPI recommends that
states carefully and systematically consider their reasons for privatization before making changes (U.S. DHHS, 2007). The capability of
the private sector to adequately deliver services must be carefully assessed. Further, cost savings should not be a key reason for privatization, as they may not materialize. As described above, the primary
motivating factors for privatization in Nebraska appeared to be a need
to reform the child welfare system to quickly meet established standards, indicated by both the 2002 and 2008 Child and Family Service
Reviews (DHHS, 2011a) and a desire to reduce state spending on nonreimbursed entitlement services. Despite clear recommendations advising against the use of such factors as impetus for privatization, this
rationale spurred Nebraska to move rapidly towards reform efforts.
The state executive branch also appeared to rush towards privatization following a number of high proﬁle cases involving the child welfare system (Schulte, 2012). Proponents of the privatization effort argued that competition within the private market place would lead to
reduced government spending and higher quality services (Young,
2009b). However, for several of the agencies involved with the effort, their contract with the state represented their ﬁrst foray into
the provision of child welfare services. They lacked any track record
upon which one could reasonably predict they would have success in
effective delivery of quality, low cost services. The legislative audit
of the privatization effort found evidence that several of the agencies
involved had not previously demonstrated the capability to provide
needed child welfare services before the effort began (DHHS, 2011a).
4.1.2. What is the level of stakeholder support for privatization?
The CWPI recommends that states planning to privatize child welfare services include service providers and stakeholders in the decision making process and adequately justify and explain the process to
the public agencies involved (U.S. DHHS, 2007). Examinations of Kansas’s recent large scale privatization process indicated that many key
stakeholders had not been included in discussions pertaining to the
planning and design of child welfare reform, creating problems during
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the implementation process (James Bell Associates, 2001 in US DHHS,
2007; Figgs & Ashlock, 2001 in US DHHS, 2007). In Kansas, failure to
achieve buy-in and promote involvement from local agencies led to a
concern about the capability of adequate service delivery from the private providers. Conversely, a more successful, smaller-scale privati
zation effort in El Paso County, Colorado placed a clear priority on the
inclusion of stakeholders throughout the planning and implementation process, emphasizing ongoing communication once the private
contracts were in place (U.S. DHHS, 2007). The smaller effort in El
Paso County was centered around a clearly deﬁned mission shared by
leadership in several public agencies involved in child welfare: “eliminating poverty and family violence” (Hutson, 2003, p.2). This mission
was shared with and helped to foster engagement from recipients of
services in the community, private and public agency staff, and private and public agency leadership (Hutson, 2003).
The performance audit conducted under the direction of LR37 reports that Nebraska’s Executive Branch engaged in the privatization
process with virtually no involvement of the legislature. While this action was not judged to be a misuse of authority, neglecting to include
the legislature as a key stakeholder represents a failure to adhere to
best practices as outlined by the U.S. DHHS (2007) and supported by
the successes and failures of prior privatization efforts. Nebraska’s
DHHS did not seek approval from the legislature prior to privatization because they were not intending to utilize additional state funding. In a media report on the privatization effort, a Senator from Nebraska’s largest city, Omaha, stated, “The executive branch and the
Department of Health and Human Services set out on this adventure
by themselves” (Schulte, 2012).
The performance audit indicates that DHHS’s attempts to solicit
feedback on the privatization effort from community stakeholders
brought mixed feedback, and was certainly not fully supportive. The
state solicited feedback on the initiative through email and public forums and was often criticized for moving too quickly without careful
planning. Moreover, the performance audit’s review of this feedback
indicated that prominent children’s advocates warned that agencies
bidding for contracts would be unable to accurately estimate the costs
of service delivery. Overall, the audit concluded that DHHS had not
adequately engaged the full range of stakeholders and appeared to be
somewhat unresponsive to stakeholder feedback (DHHS, 2011a).
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4.1.3. Has the public agency set aside enough time for planning and
designing the initiative?
Research on privatization efforts has indicated that many states have
released requests for proposals (RFPs) from private agencies with the
intent to provide child welfare services within a short timeframe and
without sufﬁcient preparation, especially when faced with increased
pressure from state legislatures and federal child welfare organizations (Kahn & Kamerman, 1999;Mahoney,2000in U.S. DHHS, 2007).
Nebraska’s child welfare system received recommendations for reform
in September 2008, after it was determined that the state did not meet
adequate standards of care. While there was certainly a need for child
welfare reform in Nebraska, problems highlighted in the 2008 review were long standing and by no means evidence of a new or emer
gency situation. Many states have experienced much greater turmoil
in their child welfare systems, and federal or state courts typically intervene when state agencies are unable to solve problems indepen
dently (Golden, 2009). The system in Nebraska was not in such an
acute state of crisis that administrators needed to engage in rapid reorganization in a manner that Golden refers to as “building the plane
while ﬂying it” (2009, p. 19). Despite the lack of acute crisis, by July
2009, ten months after the recommendations were received, six implementation contracts had been signed by private agencies. The recommended time frame for states to plan and prepare RFPs is 12 to 18
months (U.S. DHHS, 2007).
4.1.4. Are there sufﬁcient administrative and cost data to develop
contracts and estimate case rates and other service costs?
In order to effectively shift responsibility for delivery of child welfare
services from the public to the private sector, it is extremely important
that an accurate estimate of the cost of service delivery be derived (U.S.
DHHS, 2007). Without an accurate estimate of funds utilized, caseload
trends, service utilization, and performance in the current system, it is
impossible to create benchmarks that hold private agencies responsible
for improvements from the previous system (Golden, 2009). Similarly,
it is equally important for private agencies to keep accurate records if
privatization efforts are to demonstrate improvements.
The performance audit conducted under the direction of LR37
found that DHHS failed to conduct a cost–beneﬁt analysis or assess
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ﬁnancial implications in any formal manner prior to privatization in
2009 and failed to identify expected goals, benchmarks, or timeframes
until well after the initiative had been implemented (DHHS, 2011a).
Contracts and reimbursement amounts with private agencies were
created based on the amount the state had previously spent on service
provision, and were not adjusted to include the additional responsibilities these private agencies were taking on (Stoddard, 2010). This was
likely an especially detrimental mistake given the shift from a fee-forservice reimbursement system to a risk-based system that was part of
Nebraska’s privatization effort. In general, setting prospective rates
for child welfare services is difﬁcult because it requires a level of accuracy in estimation that is beyond most child welfare systems, which
is why risk-based systems are themselves risky (Wulczyn, 2000).
As the privatization effort progressed, problems related to lack of
an accurate estimate of costs continued. During the ﬁrst year of service provision under privatization, the state budget was cut such that
contractors were not paid as much as had been originally agreed upon
(Stoddard, 2010). Throughout the privatization effort, it was clear that
the lead agencies were unprepared to manage costs within the new
risk-based system: lead agencies voiced concerns continually throughout the privatization process about their ability to deliver services using the budgets they projected when signing contracts with the state
and multiple lead agencies were bankrupt by the time their contracts
were terminated with the state (Center for the Support of Families and
Hornby Zeller Associates, Inc., 2012). As a result, by July 2012, DHHS
announced that the sole remaining private contractor would no longer be paid through a risk-based system and would begin paying for
services on a case-by-case basis (Stoddard, 2012b).
4.1.5. Is there viable competition in the community to provide the
targeted services?
If privatization efforts are to be successful, circumstances must exist that lead to market competition and create an incentive to deliver
higher quality services at lower cost (Nightingale & Pindus, 1997).
These circumstances include the presence of multiple competitors who
will in fact compete to provide services. Further, once private agencies have signed contracts with the government, ﬁnancial incentives
and disincentives (e.g., the possibility of losing a contract to another
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agency if services are not effectively delivered) must continue to promote competition. When agencies submitted proposals and signed
implementation contracts in the beginning of Nebraska’s privatization effort, there was early evidence that this type of competition had
not developed. First, the fact that two of the agencies that signed contracts (Agencies 2 and 3) were based outside of Nebraska can be seen
as evidence of the paucity of providers and the lack of agencies experienced in operating large-scale child welfare services. Problems with
a lack of sufﬁcient providers to create competition were especially evident in central and western Nebraska, where only one agency submitted a bid to provide services. This should have come as no surprise, as
the number and distribution of human service agencies in highly rural areas is an ongoing national problem. A Senator from this area of
the state was quoted in the news media as saying, in retrospect, “Out
here, we don’t have a lot of providers…looking back, that was a clue
we had a problem” (Lauby, 2011).
In addition to problems of limited competition brought about
by the low number of existing service providing agencies, Nebraska
largely suffered from an absence of competition within the job market
of individuals with the skills necessary to provide child welfare services. As identiﬁed in both the 2002 and 2008 federal CFSR of Nebraska’s child welfare system, the state historically suffered from a shortage of medical, mental health service, and foster care providers (U.S.
DHHS, 2003, 2009). The small number of trained providers is further
compounded by misdistribution of skilled staff across the State, and in
many areas, there are simply not enough trained social service workers to meet the needs of the children and families served by the child
welfare system. Given the lack of available adequately trained providers of child welfare services in Nebraska, it seems unrealistic to have
expected that private agencies could capitalize on competition within
the child welfare services job market by accessing a pool of providers
more capable than those that were part of the public system.
4.1.6. Do private providers have sufﬁcient skills and administrative
capacity to manage large-scale contracts, and monitor service
delivery and client outcomes?
Most of the agencies involved had limited or no experience managing large-scale contracts or coordinating community-based services
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(Young, 2012b). Several private providers were new to contracting at
such large scales and thus lacked the experience and administrative
capacity to effectively handle the necessary bureaucracy. Early in the
process, Agency 6 determined that they had neither the funding nor
the organizational experience necessary to manage its subcontracts
with agencies needed to provide services, and elected not to sign a second services contract. The limited allocation of state funds during the
ﬁrst year of privatization created additional challenges for the ﬁve remaining lead agencies, leading a representative from one of the lead
agencies to state that they would need to be “very creative” (Young,
2009b). The state audit identiﬁed a failure on the part of DHHS to
evaluate and vet the lead agencies, thus contracting with organizations that had previously demonstrated inadequate skills and capacity (Young, 2012b). For example, at the time the initial contracts were
signed, Agency 3 was predominantly government funded, had inadequate assets, no credit line, and an insufﬁcient cash balance, indicating that they would likely be unable to manage the increasing caseloads under privatization (Overstreet, 2011; Schulte, 2012). Despite
clear evidence suggesting that the private agencies were ill prepared
to handle the administrative requirements of full-scale privatization,
DHHS elected to proceed with the reform efforts.
4.1.7. Do private agency front line staff have sufﬁcient skills and
knowledge about child welfare policies and evidence based reform to
deliver services?
Lead agencies in Nebraska faced additional challenges in regard to hiring qualiﬁed front life staff. Nebraska has a paucity of in-state undergraduate and graduate level programs with which to train case workers and other direct service staff. It is estimated that fewer than 150
students graduate each year with master’s degrees in social work at
the University of Nebraska at Omaha, the state’s only accredited Master of Social Work program (University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO)
Grace Abbott School of Social Work, 2013). Further, most of these students do not go into child welfare, which is one of the most emotionally taxing and poorly paid ﬁelds within social work. Compounding
this problem of availability is the fact that most of the jobs created under privatization were relatively low-wage positions, making them unattractive to many of the potential workers in the already limited pool.
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Agency 3 struggled to recruit and train qualiﬁed staff. Front-line
workers enlisted by Agency 3 often had no prior experience, limited
education and struggled to interact within such a complex system
(Lauby, 2011; O’Hanlon, 2012). Additionally, under LR568, the Health
and Human Services Committee received feedback about concerns regarding quality and care of training (LR37).
4.1.8. Is the public agency prepared to design a new service
delivery system, and assume new roles focused on contract design,
procurement, and monitoring?
Deﬁcits in the ability of Nebraska’s DHHS to successfully design largescale contracts were identiﬁed prior to privatization and highlighted
within the state audit (LR37). DHHS failed to utilize the available resources and expertise of Nebraska’s Department of Administrative Services prior to or during the planning and execution of these contracts.
Although the audit conducted under LR37 determined that DHHS met
the minimum standards related to contract design, the omission of a
cost–beneﬁt analysis was considered a “critical error” and a violation
of evidence-based practices. As a result, funds were awarded based
on the amount previously spent by the state, with the expectation that
private agencies would provide additional service coordination for an
increasing population, for less money, while simultaneously obtaining improved outcomes. The executive director of the Nebraska Appleseed Center stated that these contracts required private agencies to
“do the impossible” (Stoddard, 2010).
The absence of clearly identiﬁed benchmarks and outcomes prior
to implementation foreshadowed the inability of the state to effectively perform their responsibilities regarding monitoring and oversight. Although oversight systems were identiﬁed in the contracts between DHHS and the lead agencies, there were no identiﬁed goals with
which to hold lead agencies accountable (DHHS, 2011a). DHHS did
not adequately monitor the contracts signed by private agencies and
were thus unaware that subcontractors were often not paid for their
services (Young, 2012b). At the same time, costs of service provision
within agencies increased substantially, but the key players from the
lead contractors have not been able to provide an explanation or any
documentation (Schulte, 2012).
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4.1.9. Are roles and responsibilities clear between the public and
private sectors?
The delineation of clear roles and responsibilities for all parties involved in child welfare is one of the most challenging aspects of privatization, compounded further by the fact that ultimately, the public
agency retains responsibility for the quality of services, client outcomes, appropriate use of public funds, and compliance with established guidelines (U.S. DHHS, 2007). During large scale privatization
in Nebraska, contracting agencies were expected to take over the direct services operations of the child welfare system, including transportation, family support, parenting education, foster care, and supervision of any court-ordered visitation (Young, 2009b). DHHS was
to retain case management oversight responsibilities (DHHS, 2011a).
However, the legislative audit conducted under LR568 indicated
confusion pertaining to the division of responsibilities, noting that
portions of the plan were “pretty vague” (LR37). In October 2010, ap
proximately one year after the services contracts were implemented,
DHHS announced that they would be transferring additional case management responsibilities to the private agencies, but did not provide
funding to cover these added services (DHHS, 2011a). Thus, private
agencies were required to provide services beyond what had been
originally included in their contracts and received no additional compensation for doing so. The shifting nature of the division of responsibility was seen as a barrier to effective collaboration.
4.1.10. Will privatizing services alone bring about improved outcomes
or will the agency need to implement other reforms in tandem with
privatization to improve system performance?
Privatization efforts do not exist in a vacuum, and need to be con
sidered in the context of additional reform efforts and broader state
and federal policy. It is unlikely that privatization alone will address
the problems inherent in a system that serves a substantial number of
children and families with very little funding (U.S. DHHS, 2007). However, as indicated in the 2002 and 2008 CFSRs, numerous domains under the umbrella of service provision were identiﬁed as areas needing
improvement, including response to and prevention of maltreatment,
the responsiveness of the state’s case review system, and placement
stability. The recommendations put forth from the CWPI suggest that

H u b e l e t a l . i n C h i l d r e n a n d Yo u t h S e r v i c e s R e v i e w 3 5 ( 2 0 1 3 )

23

privatization of case management and a shift in the payment structure
should be included as part of larger, state-wide reforms of the system, rather than the entirety of the reform effort (U.S. DHHS, 2002).
These recommendations did not appear to factor into the reform
effort in Nebraska. Essentially, the privatization effort was never
mapped onto the system problems identiﬁed in the CFSR process.
The state did not explicitly outline benchmarks and outcomes prior to
privatization, though identiﬁed goals included a reduction in the number of children in out of home care, and more broadly, the provision of
improved services at lower cost. It was not overtly apparent how the
privatization and reform efforts would address the individual areas of
concern noted in the CFSRs, nor how privatization would lead to the
identiﬁed outcomes. In other words, the state never speciﬁed a logical
model linking elements of privatization to the outcomes of interest.
The private agencies who withdrew from their contracts or whose
contracts were terminated by the state cited a loss of signiﬁcant funds
as a primary factor (LR 37). However, prior research, along with previous attempts at statewide privatization (e.g., Kansas), have indicated that these ﬁnancial difﬁculties are not uncommon during the
early stages of privatization efforts, and that overall spending tends
to increase with privatization as compared to the costs of publically
administered services (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Kahn & Kamerman, 1999). It would appear that all parties were relatively naïve
regarding the immediate ﬁnancial realities of privatization and the
state did not have sufﬁcient policies or funds in place to support the
private agencies during the costly early stages.

5. Lessons for child welfare practitioners and policymakers
Practitioners and policymakers considering the privatization of child
welfare services can use four clear lessons learned from Nebraska’s recent statewide privatization effort to improve future initiatives. First,
those involved in the planning and design of privatization should consider the potential for increased short-term costs. Second, clear plans
for the delegation of roles and responsibilities should be identiﬁed.
Third, privatization efforts should be closely tied to desired outcomes.
Fourth, policy objectives should be balanced by the realities of state
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and local service systems. As demonstrated by Nebraska’s experience,
conceptual limitations of privatization, such as the use of risk-based
reimbursement procedures, are compounded by speciﬁc failures of
planning and implementation, particularly ﬁnancial and organizational oversights.
Nebraska’s large-scale effort to privatize child welfare services
provides evidence that, when considering the potential beneﬁts of
privatization, potential for increased costs (especially during initial
stages) should be integrated into planning and contracts. As has been
repeatedly true for other states (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003), Nebraska did not save money by privatizing child welfare services. Nebraska’s experiment with privatization provides a clear warning to
other states considering similar initiatives: the cost of providing services for the children that need child welfare services will increase
if the government shifts responsibility for service provision to a private agency while remaining responsible for oversight of these services, at least in the near term. Despite contrary evidence, Nebraska
appeared to expect that private agencies could serve families within
a budget that allowed for the same amount of funding utilized by the
state during the previous year (Stoddard, 2010). The fact that an additional 3.03 million dollars was paid to contractors than originally
planned should serve as a lesson to child welfare policymakers that,
even if cost savings are theoretically possible though privatization, implementing an initiative is inevitably accompanied by increased costs
associated with transitions, start-ups, and new government monitoring (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003; Platte Institute for Economic
Research, 2012).
Planning for increased costs is especially crucial if risk-based reimbursement procedures are to be a part of new contracts. Risk-based
reimbursement procedures are largely based on managed health care
principals, however, private agencies that serve children in child welfare have not yet developed the sophisticated tools and technologies
that managed health care organizations use to ensure quality care
while limiting spending (McCullough & Schmitt, 2000). In the future, privatization efforts, especially those that include a switch to
risk-based reimbursement procedures, should consider the high costs
that will be associated when private agencies work with the government to develop a system for demonstrating that intended gains in
service efﬁciency have been realized. It is important to point out that,
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as was true in Nebraska and as is unfortunately the national norm in
the child welfare arena, there is little basis by which to predict how
much quality, effective child welfare services should cost (Freundlich
& Gerstenzang, 2003). Prior to privatization, Nebraska’s child welfare spending did not lead to services for children and families that
met national standards for safety, permanency, and well-being outcomes. Thus, as is nationally the case, the public sector’s historical
cost of service provision seemed an inadequate basis by which to predict how much spending would be needed on future child welfare services. When privatization is considered as a possible tool for future
child welfare reform, it should be kept in mind that realistic baseline
estimates of need and service utilization are difﬁcult to make in child
welfare and, thus, it will be exceedingly difﬁcult to ever be able to document cost savings (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003).
Current difﬁculties with predicting the future cost of child welfare services do not make increased efﬁciency through privatization
impossible, but overwhelmingly point to the need to tie budgets for
contracting agencies closely to realistic estimates of potential spending by private agencies. Wulczyn (2000) details strategies for child
welfare reform and strongly emphasizes the need for strategies for
development of baseline budgets that allow agencies to plan for resource allocation over the course of a ﬁscal year. While these recommendations are relevant for all future privatization efforts, context
speciﬁc to Nebraska’s experience increased the difﬁculty of using this
system of pay. Nebraska’s contracts with lead agencies would have
likely been more successful if the budgets were based on accurate estimates of the number of children that would be served by the agencies, the duration of children’s need for service from the agency, the
costs of delivering service plans, and the administrative cost associated with working with the public sector to monitor outcomes (Wulczyn, 2000). Furthermore, these types of estimates would have been
impossible to make given the timeline of Nebraska’s privatization effort. When contracts were awarded to lead agencies prior to any analyses of cost–beneﬁt or effort to predict the manner in which the shift
in risk and responsibility would increase the overall cost of service delivery, both the state and the lead agencies were left with little basis by
which to allocate limited child welfare funding. In future initiatives using private sector agencies for delivery of child welfare services, timelines should allow for careful analyses of projected agency budgetary
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needs and planning for ﬂexibility in situations where the frequently
unstable costs delivering these types of services exceed expectations.
The difﬁculties described above that Nebraska encountered with
delegation of roles and responsibilities during the privatization effort
also point to the importance of careful planning in child welfare reform. As is clear from Nebraska’s experience and from previous privatization efforts in other states, shifting service provision from the public to the private sector involves a great deal of change for all of the
professionals involved (Flaherty et al., 2008). The child welfare service system is complex and involves services aimed at a diverse range
of goals (e.g., child safety, family preservation, foster care, adoption).
As can be seen from the challenges encountered in Nebraska, vague
stipulations regarding division of responsibility for these services and
goals will impede the collaboration that must occur if government
contracts with private agencies are to be successful. Similar to what
was learned from Kansas’s recent effort to privatize child welfare services, Nebraska’s attempt provides additional evidence that contracts
with private agencies are likely to be unsuccessful if they do not contain clear language about creation of new roles, expectations, and division responsibilities (Flaherty et al., 2008).
The importance of closely tying goals for child welfare reform
to improved services for children and families has been emphasized
consistently in previous literature and is underscored by the results
of Nebraska’s privatization effort (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003).
As described above, a signiﬁcant area of concern noted in the performance audit of Nebraska’s privatization effort was the failure to
produce outcomes that addressed concerns noted in previous CSFRs.
This was true in a smaller scale privatization effort that occurred in
the late 1990s in Missouri, where poorly deﬁned outcomes and methods used to assess outcomes led to difﬁculty measuring performance
and an inability to make changes consistent with CSFR recommendations (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). Given the overwhelming
evidence related to the inability of privatization, particularly of child
welfare services, to produce cost-savings, it is important that goals for
the shifting of responsibility from the public to the private sector focus on addressing deﬁcits in the current system. For example, in New
York, the STAR (Safe and Timely Adoptions and Reuniﬁcations) Program incorporates clear goals for improvement in timely moves towards permanent placement into state contracts with public agencies.
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Agencies able to demonstrate that they are able to increase discharges
into permanent homes without a corresponding increase in re-entries or transfers to other agencies are rewarded with increased government funding though ﬂexible dollars that they are able to spend
on a variety of services designed to further improve placement permanency. Innovations like the STAR Program suggest the possibility
of successful outcomes, but highlight the fact that the ability to incorporate goals for improved outcomes into reform will require careful foresight and planning: in order for agencies to participate in the
program, they must provide historical data on outcomes such as time
to reuniﬁcation and time to adoption, demonstrating the need for
thorough information gathering prior to public–private collaborations
(Westat & Chapin Hall Center for Children, 2002).
A ﬁnal and overall lesson learned from the recent privatization effort in Nebraska is the importance of balancing the realities
of the state/local social service system with policy objectives regarding government size and spending. The executive branch of Nebraska’s government, which was solely responsible for the decisions that
led to large-scale privatization, highly values conservative government spending and historically has made decisions that result in a
ﬁnancially secure state. Justiﬁcations for privatization of social services are consistent with conservative values, which assume that responsibilities can be reallocated to private agencies so that government size is reduced and funding can be restructured. This would then
ensure that these agencies are motivated to work more efﬁciently than
the public sector (Nightingale & Pindus, 1997). However, Nebraska’s
experience highlights the importance of balancing these values with
the realities of the local community service capacity and potential for
development of marketplace competition between social service providers. Unfortunately, as has been true for other states that have attempted to privatize child welfare services, Nebraska’s reform effort
did little to address the underlying problem that the state’s capacity
to serve children in child welfare is underdeveloped and hindered by
a paucity of trained providers (Freundlich & Gerstenzang, 2003). As
this case study has demonstrated, transferring responsibility from
public to private agencies alone is unlikely to improve provision of
child welfare services for children and families, a task that requires a
highly organized system of care and commitment from a large body
of dedicated and well-trained professionals.
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